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DCI MEETING WITH THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (MAGID)

8 June 1977

AGENDA

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INTRODUCTION		
Issue #1	Communications: Staff	(15 min)
Issue #2	Communications: Sub- stantive Guidelines	(15 min)
Issue #3	Internal Coordination of Intelligence	(15 min)
Issue #4	Interagency Cooperation	(10 min)
General Discussion		(5 min)

Additional problems, not for discussion at this meeting, are attached for your consideration.

Issue #1

Communications: Staff

Problem:

Our colleagues in the DDI are concerned about the gaps in communication--content, timeliness and dissemination--between employees and you and your staff. For example, two areas which have provoked much discussion and uncertainty are the upcoming reorganization of the Intelligence Community and the public tours of the building.

Recommendations:

- --Make every attempt to inform Agency employees about programs and changes that would be of concern to them before they are announced in the press;
- --Expand "Notes from the Director" or other Agencywide notices to provide a forum for timely, forthright, factual accounts of initiatives, programs and options under consideration that may affect the future structure or direction of the Agency;
- --Distribute Notes for the Director to every employee;
- --Do not rely on staff meetings to communicate items of significance to every employee;
- --Strengthen the role of DDCI or any other appropriate CIA officer, who will have the time which you lack in your role as DCI, to clarify and express your aims to Agency employees in your absence;
- --Continue to use Management Advisory Groups (MAG) as a vehicle for two-way communication.

Pros

Reduce the rumor mill and improve morale;

Create an atmosphere more conducive to improving the intelligence product;

Improve the longterm planning capabilities.

Cons

Difficulty in explaining (substantively and not superficially) plans that have not yet been fully formulated;

Place additional responsibilities on you and your staff.

DDI analysts are having difficulty responding efficiently to your needs because of uncertainty over what you want and the formats your prefer or require.

Recommendations:

- --Communicate better to analysts the reasons why briefing drafts are not used. The analysts can then send you updates on briefings that may be used later or publish elsewhere drafts that are rejected;
- --Determine how analysts can provide you with necessary background data. You might consider taking substantive specialists with you to parts of some briefing sessions and holding periodic seminars with appropriate analysts;
- --Establish a regular feedback system so analysts will know how their product is received when you brief and will be quickly informed of additional requests for information from consumers;
- --Review the expenditure of resources that many of us commit to even the most casual request from your office to ensure that information is sent to you without undue formalization, time consumption, or coordination with intermediate level supervisors;
- --Reform the process by which your requests are transmitted to working level analysts to ensure that they are not distorted by several levels of interpretation;

--Provide ready access to someone on your staff who will clarify your requests when necessary.

Pros

Use resources more efficiently;

Improved responses to your requirements and those of consumers;

Cons

Place more demands on your time and that of your staff;

May reduce intermediate level review.

Streamline flow of information.

Issue #3 Internal Coordination of Intelligence

Problem:

There is a continuing problem of insufficient coordination in the production of intelligence both within the DDI and between DDI and DDO offices. There have been cases where the President's Daily Brief (PDB) has been altered at the early evening meeting of senior managers without coordination with the responsible analyst. There have also been cases where the DDO has submitted articles for publication in the PDB without consulting with the appropriate DDI office. In addition, informal office papers (those published routinely or in response to ad hoc requests) are often distributed outside the Agency without coordination, and we assume these papers are construed to represent official agency positions when, in fact, they do not. As a consequence, errors of substance or meaning have been discovered.

Recommendations:

- --Coordinate last minute additional items and alterations to drafts for the PDB, except minor editorial changes, with a representative from the appropriate office;
- --Fully coordinate all DDO contributions to current intelligence products;
- --Coordinate with all appropriate offices those papers, including formal ones, that are submitted to non-Agency consumers and that deal with topics which are the responsibility of more than one office.

Pros

Cons

Minimize errors of fact or interpretation;

Increase production time.

Prevent overemphasis on single source reporting.

Interagency Cooperation

The Agency often has difficulty obtaining the cooperation of other USG departments and agencies. This is particularly true in receiving necessary inputs for conducting the analytic process.

The Agency seldom receives feedback on its products.

Recommendations:

- --Solicit the cooperation of other departments and agencies in providing Agency analysts with access to their data; for example, data on US policies needed for intelligence analyses;
- --Seek feedback on our products; for example, request those officials who use our biographic reports on foreign nationals to provide comments on their accuracy and suggestions for additional inclusions;
- --Consider CIA policy of circulating to other departments and agencies a list of forthcoming publications. Request that those other departments and agencies reciprocate;
- --Consider forming a centralized Office of Executive Liaison to coordinate interagency cooperation.

Pros

Cons

Better Intelligence product;

Better Interagency working relationships.

Requires more effort all around, which will possibly detract from efficiency.

The NIO system has fostered an increasing tendency to view interagency intelligence reports and NIEs as the primary method of dealing with controversial issues. Those products are fully coordinated intelligence and, as such, supposedly represent agreed community positions; in reality, the end product is often of little value to the policy maker. The judgments contained in those reports are so compromised that they are confusing and sometimes misleading. Each agency's position is eroded during the coordination process to the point that only a superficial assessment of the issues in possible. Additionally, the final product is likely to be an unbalanced, biased, and possibly inaccurate presentation due to circumvention of the coordination process by some agencies. For example, the military services and DIA often at the last minute submit a "parallel text" that restates their original position, including those portions that were deleted during coordination. The other agencies usually are unable to counter that tactic without restating their own initial views. Consequently they acquiesce.

Recommendation:

- --Encourage more intelligence analysis and production by CIA without coordination with other agencies;
- --Reduce the number of interagency intelligence products;
- --Use the NIO system to produce a community product only when a coordinated view is determined to be absolutely necessary;
- --Prohibit parallel text containing dissenting assessments after approval of the final draft of an interagency paper.

Pros

Cons

Results in more concise yet detailed intelligence;

Forces the consumer to judge relative merits of individual agency analysis;

Clear identification of agency differences;

Could generate increased interagency rivalry.

Shortens production time and increases timeliness of the product.

Not all employees are aware that you have offered an open-ended invitation for them to send you questions or issues they would like you to address.

Recommendation:

--Reannounce the above policy in an issue of Notes from the Director and in one of your staff meetings.

Issue #

Suggestion Awards System

Problem:

The Suggestion Awards Committee lacks the expertise and authority to make decisions on suggestions forwarded by employees. It sometimes gives awards to people for suggestions that should be considered integral parts of their jobs.

Recommendations:

--Give the Committee sufficient authority to act on suggestions so that it does not serve only as an intermediary between the "suggester" and the component affected by the suggestion.

--Eliminate the practice of awarding people for suggestions that should be considered integral parts of their jobs.

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Issue #

Problem:

In some work areas, smokers are having an adverse effect on the working abilities of nonsmokers.

Recommendation:

--Lend your support to the various MAG groups trying to find an equitable solution to this problem.

Inefficient and inadequately trained management often causes

- -inefficient use of resources
- -lack of coordination among resource, personnel, and program planning
- -lack of systematic management development program

Recommendations:

- --Develop a systematic managerial development program ensuring each individual is trained in appropriate managerial skills before progressing to the next managerial level;
- --Expand the Directorate-level management intern program to the Office and Group levels, giving potential managers opportunities for additional administrative experience;
- --Consider a managerial career service, enabling people to be evaluated and promoted on their managerial skills.